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This paper investigates the determinants of academic achievement in basic education (grade 1-9) 
for a sample of children (aged 9-12 in 2000) from rural China. A set of instrumental variable 
generated by the Great Famine in China, 1958-1961, is used to instrument an error-ridden 
measure of child innate ability, the cognitive ability score of each sampled child. Empirical 
results indicate strong effects of family background variables such as household income and 
parental education. Father’s education has significantly positive effect on academic achievements 
for both boys and girls, while mother’s education only matters for girls. Consistent with the 
common findings in the literature, most of school quality variables do not have significantly 
positive effects on child academic achievements.  
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JEL classification J24, I21, D13 Education is widely seen as a key determinant of income growth in developing countries in the 
past decades (Psacharopoulos 1985, 1994). Evidence from rural China suggests that education 
has contributed to income growth in a number of ways, during China’s transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy since the early 1980s. For example, education raised farm income 
by enhancing managerial skill and labor productivity in agricultural production (Yang 1997a). 
More importantly, when restrictions on factor markets were loosen during the transition, rural 
households with better-educated members acted more quickly in allocating productive inputs to 
non-farm activities, capturing higher returns yielded by these activities (Yang 2004). For example, 
better-educated people tend to specialize in non-farm and better-paid jobs (Yang 1997b).  In 
particular, people who had completed high school education were more likely to participate in 
non-farm employment than people with lower levels of education (Zhao 1999). Recent empirical 
evidence (de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008) also shows that the returns to post-primary education 
exceed the returns to primary education for off-farm workers in rural China.  
Although less studied than other measures of educational outcomes (e.g., years of 
schooling), academic skills are shown to contribute to income growth. For example, math and 
English skills are found to have positive effects on household income in Ghana (Jollife 1998). In 
China, academic skills acquired at the basic education stage (grades 1-9) is of particular 
importance because admission into high schools is based only on students’ performance in their 
high school entrance exams. Only students that have acquired sound academic skills in their basic 
education can enter high schools and thus achieve higher earnings when they participate in labor 
markets where returns to high school education are high. 
Child academic skills (measured as scores of academic achievement tests) are often 
determined by three sets of variables : family background variables such as household income and parental education; school quality variables such as teachers’ experience and physical 
facilities; and child characteristics such as gender, age, and ability (see Haveman and Wolfe, 
1995, and Glewwe 2002 for thorough reviews). The common findings in the literature are the 
positive and significant effects of family background variables (Behrman and Knowles 1999) and 
the statistically insignificant effects of school quality variables (Hanushek 2003). The strong 
associations between family background and child academic achievements have been well 
documented. For instance, the marginal benefits from investing in child education may be 
positively correlated with household income, because richer parents can afford educational inputs 
of higher quality (Behrman and Knowles 1999). Better-educated parents might place higher value 
on child education and may be more able and more willing to help their children. 
Family background would be expected to be important in determining child academic 
skills in rural China. For example, the funding structure of rural education suggests that 
household income matters. The fiscal reform in basic education in 1986 has shifted the financial 
responsibilities of funding basic education from central government to local governments and 
local communities.
1 Local communities, in turn, raised funds by charging rural households high 
tuition and numerous fees (Tsang, 1996). Since rural households often do not have easy access to 
credit, household income is the major resource available to parents to pay for school education 
and other education inputs. Child characteristics might also matter. For example, in addition to 
genetic differences, the gender bias still prevalent in most rural areas suggests that gender will 
affect academic skills. Finally, school quality should also matter since formal education is the 
main channel through which rural children acquire academic skills. Unfortunately, despite the 
importance of academic skills to boost future income growth and the commitment of China’s 
                                                
1 For example, rural primary school teachers are mostly non-government employees (known as min ban teachers), and they obtain 
their salaries from the local communities, not from the state or provincial government. government to continue to alleviate rural poverty, few studies have focused on analyzing which 
factors are among the most important determinants of academic skills in rural China.
4 As a result, 
policy makers have little empirical evidence that they can base on to decide what to invest in to 
raise academic skills of rural people in China. 
In addition to the lack of research inside China, empirical analysis might suffer from 
econometric problems among the existing studies (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006). For example, the 
omission of child innate ability could bias the estimated effects of family background variables. 
Because children’s innate ability and parental ability are genetically interlinked, children’s innate 
ability is correlated with parental education and household income, which are determined by 
parental ability. Also, the failure to control for unobserved school quality variable has been found 
to be another source of omitted variable bias (e.g., Glewwe et al. 2004). Unobserved school 
quality may bias estimates of the impacts of school quality variables. Moreover, it may also lead 
to biases in the estimated impacts of family background variables. The is because family 
background and school quality are likely to be correlated due to parents’ behavioral responses to 
school quality known to them but unobserved by researchers. Hence, in order to obtain consistent 
estimates, it is important to deal with these estimation problems. 
This paper has two goals. The first is to analyze the determinants of academic skills 
acquired in basic education in rural China. The second is to investigate the potential biases that 
arise from the failures to control for unobserved child ability and unobserved school quality. 
Clearly, any empirical analysis will only be consistent and reliable for policy concerns after 
potential biases are carefully accounted for. Therefore, the sizes and the directions of biases 
caused by these two sources of omitted variables will be assessed in this paper.  
                                                
4 Brown and Park (2002) is one exception. This paper makes two contributions in achieving these two goals, one empirical and one 
methodological. Empirically, this paper is one of the few studies that look at the determinants of 
child academic skills acquired in basic education in rural China. Methodologically, the main 
novelty of this paper is the development of an instrumental variable (IV) procedure to control for 
child ability. A “natural experiment” generated by the 1958-1961 famine in China, is used to 
construct a set of instrumental variables for an error-ridden measurement of innate ability (a 
cognitive ability test score).  
We begin the rest of the paper by developing both the conceptual framework and the 
estimation framework of demand for academic skills. We also discuss potential identification 
issues and develop possible identification strategies. Some facts in the Great Famine in China, 
1958-1961, and the IV generated by the Famine are then discussed. Next, we detail the data used 
in this study and estimation results in the empirical analysis. Summary and concludes are 
provided at the end of this paper. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The demand for academic skills 
This section sketches a simple conceptual model for thinking about the relationships between 
child academic skills and the set of determinants. This sub-section derives the demand function 
for child academic skills, which forms the basis of our empirical analysis. The next sub-section 
discusses the effects of family background and school quality on child academic skills. In 
particular, the analytics provides some insights on the directions of these effects, which have 
been overlooked in previous studies.  
Suppose a household maximizes the following (quasi-concave) utility function, (1)     (,) UUCH = , 
where C is the composite household consumption good and H stands for child academic skills, as 
measured by academic achievement test scores. The household faces two constraints in the 
maximization process: the budget constraint and the technology constraint.  
The household budget constraint is defined as:  
(2)       jj
j
CpIm += ￿ , 
where Ij is the j-th element of the educational input vector, I, pj is the corresponding j-th element 
in the price vector, p; m is the total amount of monetary resources available to the  household. 
The vector I includes years of schooling and other educational inputs, such as textbooks, extra 
reading materials and tutoring services. Correspondingly, p may include tuition, school fees and 
the cost of tutoring.  
The technology constraint is expressed as a production function of child academic skills: 
(3)   = (; ,,) P HH Ikfq, 
where the subscript P denotes HP as a production relation. The vector k is a set of child (kid) 
characteristics, including gender, age and innate ability (denoted A). The vector f  is a set of 
household characteristics, say, parental education. The vector  q represents school quality 
including teacher experience, quantity/quality of the physical facilities and other aspects. HP (·) is 
assumed to have usual properties of a production function, e.g. concavity and differentiability, to 
ensure that maxima are achievable in the household equilibrium. Note that variables in vector I 
are all endogenous, while variables in k, f, q are all exogenously given.
5 By including these 
                                                 
5 School quality q could be endogenous if multiple schools of different qualities were available for households to choose from 
(Glewwe and Jacoby 1994). If this were the case, schools of higher quality might attract children with higher ability. Then school 
quality would then become endogenous when ability is not controlled for and thus left in the error term. However, in China, a 
child is restricted to enroll in nearest school that is located in the districts where his/her family reside in. Because of this, q can be 
reasonably treated as exogenous in our setting of rural China. exogenous variables in the production function, we allow for heterogeneity in the production 
technique used to produce academic skill across families and schools.  
Solving the optimization problem (1), subject to constraints (2) and (3), yields the 
following demand functions: 
(4)      (, ; , ,) CCm = pkfq, 
(5)     (, ; , , ) jj IIm = pkfq . 
Equation (4) is the demand function for household consumption, and equation (5) is the demand 
function for educational input. Substituting (4) and (5) into equation (1), we obtain the demand 
function for child academic skills: 
(6a)    ((,; , , ));,,) P HHm = Ipkfqkfq. 
Since each element of the vector I is also a function of the same set of exogenous variables, (p, m; 
k, f), equation (6a) can also be expressed as the following equation: 
(6b)     (,; , , ) D HHm = pkfq  
Because variables in (6b) are all exogenous, equation (6) is a reduced form demand equation (as 
opposed to the structural relationship in equation (3)). The subscript D denotes HD as a demand 
function. From the above derivations, one can see that the reduced form relationship 
characterized in equation (6b) takes into account the behavioral adjustments to I in response to 
exogenous shocks in any exogenous variable in (p, m, k, f, q), while holding others constant. 
Because of these, equation (6b) is probably the most relevant for policy makers (Blau, 1999), and 
thus is of the main interest in this paper and the basis of empirical analysis in the later sections. 
 Linearizing equation (6b), we have the following estimating equation: 
 (7)         HA ae =+++ xβ qη , where x = (p, m; k, f) is the matrix of all (unobservable) exogenous variables, and ε is the error 
term. Child ability A and school quality q are listed separately because they are the sources of 
potential biases in estimation that will be discussed in more detail in section 3 below. Equation (7) 
is the equation that will be estimated in the empirical analysis. 
 
Effects of family background variables and school quality variables 
In this section, we examine the effects of family background variables and school quality 
variables in more details. In equation (7), each element in the parameter vector β and η captures 
the total effect of an exogenous change in the corresponding element in x and q, holding other 
variables constant. Since the total effect incorporates indirect behavioral adjustments, the 
structural relationship in equation (3) will also assist in analyzing the effects of x and q on H. 
The effects of family background variables, f, are expected to be positive. Consider the 
effect of the l-th variable in f, say, father’s education, fl. Differentiating both sides of equation (6a) 
with respect to fl, we have: 
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6  they are both 
positive.  
The effects of school quality variables can be derived in the same fashion. Differentiating 
both sides of equation (6a) with respect to the  k-th school quality variable,  qk (say  teacher 
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 could also be negative. 
This would occur if parents respond negatively to school quality qk, that is, if parental inputs are 
substitutes to school quality. For example, parents might reduce their educational inputs, e.g., 







 is negative, 
                                                 
6 The latter holds other things constant while the former does not. As has been correctly pointed out by Glewwe and Kremer 
(2006), different effects found in different studies do not necessarily imply the existence of biases; they could merely represent 
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suggests that negative impacts of school quality variables found in some previous 
studies
7 are not necessarily counterintuitive and do not necessarily imply the existence of biases; 
it could simply be reflecting that parent inputs and school quality are substitutes.  
 
Identification Issues 
Although the estimated effects of exogenous variables in the reduced form have important policy 
implications, they are reliable only when possible biases in econometric analysis are ruled out. 
Also, causality between these effects and child academic achievements can be established only if 
possible confounding factors are appropriately controlled for. The two factors that are most likely 
to cause biases are the unobserved school quality q and the child’s innate ability A, which have 
been highlighted explicitly in equation (7). If child ability A is omitted and if A is correlated with 
any variable in x, the estimates of the parameters associated with those variables, and probably 
all variables in equation (7), will be inconsistent, by standard econometric theory. The same 
situation occurs when one or more elements in q are omitted. The following subsections discuss 
these possibilities. 
 
Unobserved school quality 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., table 3 in Hanushek (2003). The possibility of omitted school quality variables is suggested by the finding that the impacts of 
school characteristics on student achievement are often statistically insignificant (Glewwe and 
Kremer 2006).
8 By comparing prospective estimates and retrospective estimates using data in 
Kenya, Glewwe et al (2004) find evidence of omitted school quality variables, even when 
controlling for other observable school quality variables. 
 Obviously, the omission of some school quality variables can lead to biases in the 
estimated effects of the school quality variables that are included in the regression. The quality of 
school is reflected in many dimensions. Moreover, variables that measure different dimensions of 
school quality could be correlated to each other. For example, a school with good reputation 
might attract both better teachers and more social investments in physical facilities, and thus 
reputation, teacher quality and physical facilities are correlated. However, some dimensions of 
school quality are more difficult to measure than others. Such school quality variable as 
reputation is difficult to measure and thus is likely to be omitted. As a result, the estimated effects 
of school quality variables could be biased. The directions of possible biases would depend on 
whether the omitted school quality variables are substitutes or compliments to the school quality 
variables that remain in the regression.  
Similarly, the omission of some elements in q could lead to biased estimates of the effects 
of  x. The directions of such biases depend on whether family background variables, such as 
parental education, are substitutes or compliments to school quality.  
 
Unobserved Ability 
                                                 
8 Some studies have tried to include many school quality variables in an attempt to avoid the omitted variable problem. For 
example, the Jamaican study by Glewwe et al. (1995) used more than 40 school characteristics variables. However, their findings 
show that most variables are still statistically insignificant. Ability can never be perfectly observed. The omission of child innate ability could lead to 
upward biases on the estimated impacts of family background characteristics (Behrman and 
Rosenzweig, 1999). The omitted variable bias arises because child innate ability A and family 
background f are often correlated. For example, A is positively correlated with f through the 
genetic link between child ability and parental ability and the effect of parental ability on f. 
Furthermore, A and  f could also be correlated through parents’ behavioral response to child 
ability. This correlation and thus the directions of biases in estimated effects of f caused by 
omitted ability are theoretically ambiguous. 
 
Intelligence Test Score as Imperfect Proxy for Unobserved Ability 
Another problem caused by unobserved ability comes from the attempts to control for 
child ability in practice. To avoid omitted ability biases, many studies have used some measure of 
the innate ability, most often the score of an “Intelligence” test (ITS), as a proxy variable for 
innate ability. For example, Kingdon (1996) used Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices test 
score as a proxy of innate ability and replaced A directly with the Raven’s score in the regression. 
However, none of the measurements available now can perfectly measure innate ability. They can 
at most serve as an “imperfect proxy” for ability. The use of imperfect proxy will probably lead 
to biased estimates. 
The biases caused by directly applying the proxy variable solution, i.e., replacing ability A 
directly by the imperfect proxy, ITS, can be seen below. In theory, one can always write a linear 
projection of ITS on the innate ability A as L(ITS|A ) = γAA. Then, ITS can be redefined by adding 
a residual term e that is uncorrelated with A: 
(8)       + , A ITSAe g ”  However, in addition to A, the ITS score could also reflect the influence of environmental factors 
(American Psychological Association 1995) and the test-taking skill that are not correlated with 
A. Most relevant for our case, one set of environmental factors includes a subset of school quality 
variables in q. Since China’s policy regarding school enrollment rules out the correlation between 
school quality and child ability, q will remain in e. Then equation (8) becomes: 
(9)         , A ITSAu g ”++ qδ  
where  u includes other environmental factors that are either uncorrelated with A or that are 
random. Simple algebra yields: 








Inserting (10) into (7), we have:  
(11) 
     













When A is replaced by ITS, equation (11) is estimated instead of equation (7). There are at 
least two problems with estimating equation (11). First, if some components in δ are nonzero the 





Furthermore, the bias cannot be corrected because  δ  and  γA are not estimable (since  A is 







-+  through its correlation with  u. Consequently bias arises. In contrast to the first 
problem, the second problem, which is similar to the usual measurement error problem, can be 
solved using an instrumental variable approach to eliminate the correlation between ITS and u. 
Furthermore, in practice, there are always possibilities that some components in q are omitted. Estimates of the effects of q could still be biased even when the second problem is eliminated. 
Hence, in order to eliminate possible biases due to unobserved school quality and unobserved 
child ability, one needs to control for them simultaneously. The strategy used in this paper, the 
IV-fixed effect approach will be discussed next. 
 
Identification Strategies 
If information on multiple students enrolled in the same schools is available, a natural method to 
control for unobserved school quality is simply to use school fixed effects. Take equation (7) for 
example, for the  i-th student in the  m-th school, the achievement demand function can be 
rewritten as,  
(7’)  
     









x β q η
x β
 
The vector of school quality, qm, are constant across all students in school m. The entire set of qm, 
together with its coefficient vector η, can be pooled into a school-specific constant, sm (=qmη). 
Then the usual fixed effects estimation procedure applies. The fixed effect estimator is attractive 
because it allows x to be correlated with unobserved q variables since the latter are included in 
the regression through  sm. Note that the term  sm captures the effects of all school level 
characteristics that do not vary within school m, both observed and unobserved.  
 
Even when school fixed effects are controlled for, one still needs to control for the 
unobserved child ability Aim in equation (7’) above. Since this paper also uses an ability measure
9 
to control for unobserved innate ability, the identification issues caused by imperfect proxy for 
                                                
9 In this paper, child ability is measured by the score of a cognitive ability test that was administered to each sample child in 2000 
when almost all the sample children were enrolled in primary schools. child ability must be addressed here. The IV solution applied in this paper is the approach 
proposed by Griliches and Mason (1972) and also applied in Blackburn and Neumark (1992). 
The idea is to treat ITS as an indicator, instead of a proxy variable, of the true innate ability, and 
then apply standard IV procedures to this indicator.
10 When an error-ridden measure of child 
ability ( IQ) is available, equation (11) highlights the needs to apply fixed effects and IV 




- q ηδ in (11) is simply absorbed into the 
term sm, and then equation (11) becomes:  
 (11’)  
 =  ()  
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Controlling for school fixed effects, consistent estimates of the effects of family background 
variables can be obtained if plausible instrument variables are available. The next section 
describes the set of suitable IV used in this paper. 
 
Famine in China, 1958-1961 and the Famine-generated IVs 
Good IVs are difficult to find. But history helps. A natural experiment generated by the Great 
Famine in China, 1958-1961, provides candidates for the IV needed. The famine resulted from 
the agricultural crisis in 1958 and the following political decisions regarding food allocation.
11 At 
the national level, grain production plunged by 15 percent in 1959 from its peak of 200 million 
tons in 1958. It declined by another 15 percent in 1960 and stayed flat in 1961 (State Statistical 
                                                 
10 One possible approach can be found in the Ghana study by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994). The authors extracted an innate ability 
factor as a household fixed effect, using parental ability measures. In other words, the ITS variable, i.e. the Raven score of the 
child, is instrumented by using father and mother’s Raven’s scores and other exogenous variables. Note that this approach is valid 
only if measurement errors in parental ability and child ability are uncorrelated. Also, because parental ability measures are not 
available in the data set used in this paper, other possibly suitable IVs are needed. 
11 Detailed analysis of the causes of this famine can be found in Lin (1990), Lin and Yang (1998), Lin and Yang (2000), among 
others. Bureau, 1991). In addition to the food shortage caused by the declined agricultural output, food 
allocation decisions that set high priority to urban food consumption, established during that 
period exacerbated the shock of original output decline in the rural area (Lin and Yang, 2000). To 
guarantee the success of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Chairman Mao’s ‘One Chessboard’ 
speech in the spring of 1959 reaffirmed the urban bias in food allocation and gave a high priority 
to city grain supplies over rural localities.  
The famine in 1958-1961 is now recognized as the worst in human history. It has been 
estimated that the famine caused excess deaths of some 30 million of people and lost births of 
more than 30 million, mostly in rural areas (Ashton et al. 1984). Gansu province, the study area 
in this paper, was seriously affected by the famine and the urban-biased policies that followed. 
The administration extracted 361 thousand tons of grain from Gansu to support the urban food 
supply between 1959 and 1960 despite the food shortage in the province (Walker 1984). At the 
same time, the rigorously implemented residence registration ( Hukou) system prevented rural 
people from migrating to urban areas. As a consequence, death rates increased dramatically in 
Gansu: 11.1 ‰ in 1957, 21.1‰ in 1958, 17.4 ‰ in 1959, 41.3 ‰ in 1960, and 11.5 ‰ in 1961. 
The death rate in Gansu in 1958 was the third highest among all 28 provinces for which data 
were available.  
It is clear that the famine cohort, people who were born during or slightly before the 
famine period (i.e. people who spent their early childhoods during the famine) and survived could 
be a very different cohort. In particular, people in the famine cohort might have higher ability 
endowment than those who failed to survive and those who were born after or long before the 
famine because the famine “selected” out people with higher ability.
12  
                                                 
12 Note that there is no contradiction between this argument and that in Chen et al (2007). Famine could not only select out people 
with high endowment, but also affect their lives badly ever since. The idea here is that, their high endowment could have been In addition to the selection effect, the famine can also have a somewhat offset effect on 
parents’ ability through poor prenatal nutrition intake. Recent studies on the long-term impacts of 
the famine (Chen et al. 2007) indicates that people born during the famine period have 
significantly lower heights than they would otherwise have had, which implies low nutrition 
intakes during the famine. Early prenatal nutrition has been found to be essential in human brain 
development. For example, Villar et al. (1984) found that infants whose head growth slowed due 
to poor prenatal nutrition before 26 weeks of gestation (as measured by ultrasound) grew slower 
than otherwise, and scored lower in mental performance in preschool years. Similarly, one would 
expect the famine-born cohort to have lower ability than they would otherwise. This nutrition 
effect could offset the effect the famine selection on high ability.  
If some of the parents of the sample children belong to the famine cohort, then famine can 
serve as an IV for three reasons. First, there is a large literature showing that parents’ innate 
ability is closely correlated with their children’s innate ability. Second, since the famine affects 
parents’ ability, either through the selection effect or through the poor prenatal nutrition effect, 
the famine is likely to be correlated with children’s ability. Third, assuming equation (7) is fully 
specified, controlling ability  A, famine will not have explanatory power on child academic 
achievement. In other worlds, the famine can affect children’s academic skills only through its 
effects on children’s innate ability in a fully specified model.  
 
Data  
The data used in this paper come from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF). This 
longitudinal survey follows 2000 sample children over years (2000, 2004 and 2007) in Gansu, a 
poor province located in northwestern China. During the survey, a stratified sampling strategy 
                                                                                                                                                        
masked by the long term negative impact of famine. Such endowment could still be transmitted to their children, however. was first used to select 20 counties from all non-urban, non-Tibetan counties in the province. 
Within each of the 20 counties, 5 villages were selected. Within each village, 20 children in the 
correct age range (9-12 in 2000) were randomly drawn. Separate questionnaires were 
administered to the sample children, their parents, local village leaders as well as to teachers and 
principals of the schools the sample children enrolled in at the time of the survey.  
This paper uses only the 2004 cross-section of the GSCF panel. In this sample, all 
children were enrolled in grades 1-9. This sub-sample was chosen for two reasons. First, basic 
education is an important issue in China. Nine years of basic education has been made 
compulsory in China since 1986, and the universal completion of basic education is one of the 
main goals of China’s educational policy (Tsang 1996). Second, using this sub-sample rules out 
selectivity issues caused by schooling choice in selecting high schools. Since high school 
admissions decisions in China are based on students’ performances in high school entrance 
examinations, school quality will be correlated with student ability and student achievement 
acquired in basic education, for high school students. Thus, including high school students in our 
analysis will bring about both selectivity and simultaneity issues in estimation. 
The dependent variables are child academic skills measured by math test scores. In 2004, 
a math test was administrated to all sample children. All children used the same test instrument, 
which ensures that academic skills are measured by math score at the same level of difficulty. 
Note that those sample children that were interviewed in 2000 but dropped out since then also 
took the academic achievement tests in 2004. The inclusion of these children eliminates sample 
selection biases caused by dropping out of school. 
 The most important family background variable is the household income per capita. In 
household surveys, household income is often subject to measurement error caused by under-reporting (Deaton 1997). Household expenditure is often a better measurement of household 
income. However, since household expenditure data is often recall data, it is susceptible to 
measurement error unless household members keep a detailed record of daily consumption. To 
deal with measurement error in expenditure data, household wealth per capita in 2000 is used as 
an instrument variable. The household wealth is calculated as the total value of house assets plus 
the value of the house. During the survey, the enumerators conducted the interviews in the 
household residence and thus were able to record all the assets households had. Since the 
household wealth came from record data, it does not suffer from measure error problems. Also, 
as a long term (probably 5-10 years) decision, educational investment should depend on long 
term  household resources instead of current yearly household resources. Using wealth in 2000 as 
instrument for household expenditure is similar to exacting a long term wealth component from 
the current household resource measure. In all regressions below, the logarithm of household 
expenditure per capita is instrumented by the logarithm of household wealth per capita in 2000.  
Other family background variables include parental education, number of younger 
siblings and number of older siblings, and dummy variables indicating whether the parent in 
living in the household. A parent is defined as not living in the household when he or she has 
been living outside the household for at least three months during the survey year. This variable 
reflects labor market conditions and future return to schooling for the child in terms of 
information on urban labor market and migration networks. Similarly, landholding per capita is 
included to capture future occupational choice of the child.  
Child characteristics include gender, child age measured in month, and its square. A 
cognitive ability test was administrated to each sample child in 2000 when they aged 9 to 12, 
which serves as the (error-ridden) measure for child innate ability. School quality variables used here include the most commonly used ones in previous 
studies, such as student-teacher ratio and teacher experience (the share of teachers with more than 
5 years’ teaching experience). A set of physical facility variables that have been used in China 
studies by Brown and Park (2002), and Zhao and Glewwe (forthcoming) is also included. This 
set of physical facility includes the fraction of dangerous classrooms, the fraction of rainproof 
classrooms, and the fraction of classrooms that have good condition of light. Finally, a set of 
dummy variables indicating the existence of libraries, computers, science labs and whether desks 
are available to all students in the school is included. Table 1 summarizes definitions and 
summary statistics of the key variables used in empirical analyses below. 
 
Empirical Results 
Evidence of cognitive ability score being imperfect proxy for true ability 
Before reporting the results in the academic skills demand function estimations, it may be helpful 
to provide evidence that supports the rationale of the fixed effect-IV estimator discussed above. 
The rationale comes from equation (9). Equation (9) points out that the ability measure, ITS, 
might include both effects of some school quality variables (q) and random measurement error (u) 
that are not components of child ability, A.  
To examine this possibility, a version of equation (9) is estimated, using all exogenous 
variables mentioned above: 
(9’)          , A ITSAu g =+++ qδ xθ  
where child innate ability A is not observable in equation (9’), and thus A enters the composite 
error term    AAu g + . Since  A is not correlated with  q given China’s policy regarding basic 
education, leaving it in the composite error term will not cause biases in the estimated coefficients on  q
13. Hence, any significant effects of school quality will lend support to the 
hypothesis that either δ ≠ 0 or some school quality variables are omitted. The estimation results 
(column (1) in table 2) show that two school quality variables, i.e., teacher experiences and the 
existence of science labs have positive effects on ITS, at the five percent level. For example, 
students enrolled in a school with science labs are estimated to score more than three points 
higher than students enrolled in a school without science lab. This finding suggests that either δ ≠ 
0 or some school quality variables are omitted.
 14 In either case, the school fixed effects estimator 
is appropriate to control for school quality.  
 
Demand for academic skills 
This section reports estimates of equation (11’), for math score. Ideally, when estimating the 
reduced form demand functions, one should include all prices variables, e.g. prices for 
consumption goods and prices for educational inputs. Since the consumption good has been 
treated as numeraire in the conceptual model, we simply add county dummies in regressions to 
control for local prices. County dummies also control for labor markets conditions and possibly 
future return to education. All endogenous variables, such as years of schooling and parental time 
spent helping with child homework, are excluded, for the reduced form regressions. Furthermore, 
several interactions are explored. For example, interaction between gender and parental education, 
interaction between parental residential status and parental education are included. However, 
none of these interactions, except the interaction between gender and mother’s education, is 
                                                 
13 Note that omitted school characteristics variables can lead to biases in estimated coefficients on q here. But this also lends 
support to our fixed effect strategy to control for unobserved school quality. 
14 Another interpretation is that this variable captures the effect of unobserved school quality. Note that significant effect of 
science lab is also found in Zhao and Glewwe (forthcoming). Using the same data as ours, they find that schools with science labs 
keep students in schools longer before they dropped out of schools. However, it is hard to establish causality between science labs 
and dropout decisions. A more plausible explanation is that science labs pick up, at least partly, the effects of some unobserved 
school quality: it is the unobserved school quality (e.g., school reputation) that keeps students in school longer. Along the same 
line, our finding here suggests that some unobserved school quality variables. found to be significant predictors of student achievement at five percent level. Therefore, only the 
interaction between gender and mother’s education is included below to capture gender effects.  
These significant predictive powers of endogenous variables in the first-stage regressions 
(column (2) and (3) in table 2) indicate that our IVs might not suffer from the weak IV problem. 
The instrument for household income (as measured by the logarithm of annual expenditure per 
capita) is the logarithm of household wealth per capita in 2000. As can be seen in column (3) in 
table 2, the logarithm of household wealth per capita in 2000 has strong predictive power of 
logarithm of annual expenditure per capita (p = 0.0000). The (famine-generate) IVs for ITS, the 
cognitive ability score are dummy variables indicating that the father was born in July of 1958 
and that the mother was born in December of 1956.
15 They are jointly significant at p = 0.0000 
level in the first-stage regression (column (2) in table 2).  
 
Effects of school quality variables 
Columns (1) and (2) in table 3 report the effects of school quality on students’ math 
achievements. Column (1) leaves ability A in the error term, while column (2) adds ITS as a 
proxy variable for innate ability A. The estimated effects of school quality could be biased, 
however, due to the two possible sources of bias discussed above: omitted school quality 
variables and the school quality measured in ITS. Nevertheless, the bias in the estimated effects 
of school quality in column (1)
16 is expected to be smaller than that in column (2). This is 
because estimated effects of school quality in column (1) will not suffer from the second source 
of bias, since A is left in the error term and A is not correlated with q in our sample.  
                                                 
15 The construction of this set of famine-generated IV can be found in Appendix II. 
16 The bias in x could be larger in column (1) because of the omitted child ability A and the correlation between A and x. Consistent to the findings in previous studies, most of the school quality variables do not 
have positively significant effects on students’ math skills (column (1) in table 3). The two 
teacher quality variables, the proportion of teachers with more that 5 years of teaching experience 
and the proportion of teachers with post-secondary degrees, have significantly negative effects on 
student math achievement. For example, increasing one percent of teachers with more than five 
years of teaching experiences is associated with a decrease in math score by -0.04 points. Note 
that as has been discussed above, the negative effects are not necessarily implausible; they could 
result from parents’ investment behavior in responses to school quality. 
The only two variables that have significant effects in column (1) are the existence of 
computers and that of science labs. Note that Zhao and Glewwe (forthcoming) find schools with 
science labs keep students longer in schools using the same data set used in this paper. However, 
it is difficult to establish causality between science lab and dropout decisions and better math 
achievements. A more plausible explanation is that science labs capture the effects of some 
unobserved school quality; it is the unobserved school quality (e.g. school reputation) that keeps 
students in school longer and contributes to students’ math skills.  
Adding the ability measure ITS in the model (column (2) in table 3) does not change the 
signs of the estimated effects of school quality variables, but it does change the magnitudes of 
some estimated effects. For example, the effect of teachers’ experience becomes more negative (-
0.056). This is expected because it has been shown in section 7.1 (column (1) in table 2) that 
teachers’ experience has a significant positive effect on ITS. Also, the significant effects of 
science labs disappear when ITS is added. This is also expected given the strong positive effect of 
science labs on ITS score (column (1) in table 2). Given that ITS serves as an imperfect proxy for child ability, A, we believe the estimated effects of school quality in column are believed to be 
more plausible. 
Although some significant effects of school quality that consistent to previous findings 
are found, the effects of school quality could still suffer from bias due to omitted school quality 
variable
17, and thus one needs to interpret these effects of school quality with caution.  
 
Effects of family background variables 
We have pointed out above that unobserved school quality may cause bias in the effects of family 
background variables. Thus, we only discuss the estimated effects of family background in the 
fixed effects-IV estimations (column (4) in table 3). As expected, most family background 
variables have significant effects for math score in 2004, controlling for both school quality and 
child ability (column (4) in table 3). First, the effect of household income is positively significant. 
Since household income is measured in the logarithm scale, one percent increase in household 
income is estimated to be associated with 0.04 points increase in math score; or equivalently, 
doubling income is associated with 4 points (or 0.3 standard deviation) increase in math score. 
Note that for households in our sample, the mean annual household expenditure per capita was 
only 1276 yuan in 2004, which was equal to 155 U.S. dollars in 2004. This means that doubling 
household income for an average household is not very demanding, and transferring cash to poor 
household could have big effects on child academic achievement.  
                                                 
17 A simple data experiment is used to explore this possibility, and this simple experiment offers evidence of omitted school 
quality variable. The data set includes one variable, the class size at the class level, as opposed to the school level. This variable 
enable us to compare the estimated effects of class size before and after school fixed effects are controlled for since class size has 
extra variation after school fixed effects are controlled for. The results of this data experiment are reported in table A1 in 
Appendix. Note in table 3, we use student-teacher ratio for the full sample, because the class size variable is available for only 952 
observations. To ensure that results are comparable when we replace student-teacher ratio by class size, column (1) in table A1 
repeats the exercise of column (1) in table 3, using only observations with variable class size available, while column (2) in table 
A1 replaces student-teacher ratio by class size. It can be seen that this simple substation does not change much of the result, 
except that the class size variable has a negative impact on student achievement. Column (3) in table A1 controls for school fixed 
effects. After controlling for school fixed effects, the impact of class size becomes negatively significant at 10% level, which is 
more close to common sense and provides evidence of omitted school quality variables. Second, parental education has significant impacts on child math achievement, but the 
effects of father’s education and mother’s education differ. Other things being equal, an 
additional year of father’s education is associated with about a 0.3 point increase in math 
achievement, for both boys and girls (since interaction between gender and father’s education is 
not significant and thus is excluded). In contrast, mother’s education matters only for girls, and 
the effect of mother’s education is almost doubled in size as that of father’s education. The 
finding that mother’s education plays different roles in boys and girls’ math achievements 
suggests potential gender bias in education decision makings. The finding that girls scored 
significantly (three points) lower than boys and the fact that more than 500 mothers’ in the 
sample have never been in schools imply that females have been discriminated against for more 
than one generation in terms of education in rural Gansu. Thus, one possible explanation for the 
differential effects of mother’s education for boys and girls is that more-educated mother might 
provide a role model for girls, who provide higher motivation for their daughters who would be 
discriminated against otherwise. This lends supports for designing policy to raise female 
education in order to reduce gender inequality in the future. 
The number of siblings, either younger or older, has positive effect on math achievement. 
Significant sibling effects indicate that children may benefit from helping each other at home. In 
other words, learning in family is a public good within the household.  
 
Potential biases 
Although the actual size of biases cannot be calculated here because the columns in table 
3 use different estimators. However, we can get some information about these biases by 
comparing estimated effects across columns in table 3. The total biases caused by both unobserved school quality and child ability can be assessed by comparing coefficients in column 
(1) and column (4). Income effects are overestimated (column (1)) to be about 1.5 points (or 75 
percent) higher than the consistent estimates (3.97 points) in column (4), when one does control 
for either unobserved school quality or child ability. Also, the effect of father’s education is 
underestimated in column (1). The biases caused by unobserved school quality (by comparing 
column (3) and (2) in table 3) have the similar effects as the total biases discussed above. 
Comparing columns (3) and (4) in table 3 provides some information on the biases caused 
by random measurement error (u in equation (9), not the part that caused by school quality) in the 
ability measure. The large increase in the coefficient on the child ability measure (from 0.3 to 1) 
indicates the existence of attenuation bias caused by measurement errors. The biggest bias in 
other estimates is the estimated effect of fathers living in the household. Column (3) suggests that 
father living in the household can increase math score by 1.7 points, controlling for income and 
father’s education. But this effect is no longer significant when the famine-generated IVs are used. 
These imply that having a migrating father is not necessarily harmful for child education; this is 
probably because fathers that participate in migration in rural China are mostly temporary 
migrants and they do spend a certain amount at home each year. In short, the bias caused by u is 
probably not a serious problem when school fixed effects are controlled for. This suggests that 
the biases caused by failing to control for unobserved school quality may be more serious than 
measurement error in the ability measure. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper investigates the determinants of academic skills acquired in basic education for a 
sample of rural children (in grades 1-9) from Gansu, China. Consistent with the common findings in the literature (without controlling for school fixed effects), most school quality variables do 
not have significantly positive effects on child academic achievements. Teacher quality variables, 
i.e., teaching experience and degree held, have significantly negative effects on child academic 
achievements. Although they seemed counterintuitive, they are plausible if parents behave 
negatively in response to school quality. The existences of computers and science labs, in 
contrast, are found to have significantly positive effects on child academic achievements. 
However, given the possibility of omitted school quality variables, we interpret this finding with 
caution. It could be that the existence of science labs captures some unobserved school quality 
variables, e.g., school reputation, and it is these unobserved school quality variables that 
contribute to student achievements. Without further information, we cannot conclude these 
significant effects are indeed the causes of student achievements, and thus we defer policy 
implications to future research.  
The causality between family background and student achievement can be established 
with more confidence using our school fixed effect-IV estimator using the famine-generated IVs. 
Significant income effects are found in reduced form estimations, which imply that governmental 
transfer programs might have big effects in raising child academic achievement. For example, A 
cash transfer of 150 U.S. dollars can increase the child’s math achievement by 4 points ( or 0.3 
standard deviations) for an average household. Father’s education has significant impacts on both 
boys’ and girls’ academic skills. However, the magnitudes of these effects are small, which is 
consistent with the common finding in previous studies (Behrman and Knowls 1999). 
Interestingly, mother’s education is significant for girls only, suggesting that the possible 
existence of gender bias in investing in child education in rural China. Given the evidence that girls perform significantly lower than boys, raising mother’s education may have an important 
impact on closing gender inequality in rural China.  
Biases caused by unobserved school quality and unobserved child ability are also assessed. 
Although they can both cause biases in the estimates of family background effects, the biases 
caused by unobserved school quality are more serious than that caused by unobserved child 
ability. This finding points out the need to develop methods for appropriately controlling for 
school quality in future research in child educational outcomes.  
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Econ. Develop.  Cultur. Change 47(4):767–82Table 1. Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Number of 
Observation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min  Max 
Dependent Variables           
Math Score  1718  16.86  12.78  0  50 
           
Family Background           
Father’s education  (in years)  1815  6.44  3.09  0  14 
Mother’s education
 a (in years)  1834  3.99  3.10  0  12 
Father in household (=1, i f father 
lives in the household) 
1850  0.76  0.42  0  1 
Mother in household (=1, if mother 
lives in the household) 
1850  0.96  0.18  0  1 
Household size   1850  4.71  1.03  2  10 
Log expenditure per capita (in yuan)  1848  6.80  0.71  4.34  9.62 
Land holding per capita (in mu)  1850  2.05  1.48  0  20 
Number of Older Siblings  1446  0.73  0.81  0  5 
Number of Younger Siblings  1490  0.60  0.68  0  4 
           
Child Characteristics           
Gender (1= Female)  1850  0.42  0.49  0  1 
Age in months  1696  180.57  14.84  148  238 
Age in months squared   1696  32826.01  5381.06  21904  56644 
  Cognitive Ability Test Score  1445  17.05  9.82  0  43 
           
School Characteristics           
Student-teacher ratio  1441  22.59  13.55  2  180 
Class size   961  52.11  13.41  15  92 
Teachers experience>5 years (%)  1446  79.21  20.07  0  100 
Teacher with post secondary education 
(%) 
1446  67.65  32.94  0  100 
Dangerous classroom (%)  1417  19.44  27.71  0  100 
Rainproof classroom (%)  1427  79.63  33.91  0  100 
Classroom with good light condition 
(%) 
1446  70.38  38.00  0  100 
Desks for all students (=1 if yes)  1446  0.89  0.31  0  1 
Electricity (=1 if yes)  1446  0.99  0.05  0  1 
Library (=1 if yes)  1446  0.89  0.31  0  1 
Computer (=1 if yes)  1446  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Science lab (=1 if yes)  1446  0.60  0.49  0  1 
a.  516 mothers have never been in schools. 
b.  Yuan is the Chinese currency. One dollar= 8.27 Yuan in 2004. 
c.  Mu is the metric used in China to measure land size. One hectare = 15 mu. Table 2. First-Stage Regressions 
Dependent variables  (1) Cognitive 
test score in 
2000 
(2) Cognitive test 




Family Background:       
Father’s education  0.000      (0.079)  -0.058        (0.073)  0.004       (0.005) 
Mother’s education  0.154      (0.111)  0.154         (0.099)  0.019*** (0.007) 
Father in household  0.999*
b   (0.526)  1.445***   (0.537)  -0.025      (0.037) 
Mother in household  -1.418     (1.390)  -2.372        (1.544)  0.084       (0.109) 
Log expenditure per capita
a  1.219      (1.325)  --  -- 
Landholding per capita  0.062      (0.164)   0.180         (0.207)  0.023       (0.014) 
   Number of younger siblings  0.369      (0.507)  0.179         (0.402)  -0.098      (0.028) 
   Number of older siblings  0.445      (0.349)  0.304         (0.319)  -0.032      (0.022) 
   Log wealth per capita in 2000
c  --  0.112         (0.255)  0.181*** (0.018) 
   Father born in July 1958  --  20.775*** (7.679)  0.325       (0.542) 
   Mother born in December 1956  --  -15.601**  (7.150)  0.229       (0.505) 
Child Characteristics:       
   Female (1=female)  -0.839    (0.698)  -0.561        (0.697)  0.008       (0.049) 
  Age in months  -0.242    (0.313)  -0.182        (0.302)  0.043**   (0.021) 
Age in months squared  0.001     (0.001)  0.000         (0.001)  -0.000**  (0.000) 
Gender Effects       
Female×mother’s education  0.067      (0.136)  -0.010        (0.131)   0.000      (0.001) 
School Characteristics:       
Student-teacher ratio  0.014      (0.013)     
Teachers with experience>5 years (%)  -0.001     (0.012)     
Teacher with post secondary education (%)  0.047***(0.013)     
Dangerous classroom (%)  0.018*    (0.010)     
Rainproof classroom (%)  0.004      (0.007)     
Classroom with good light condition (%)  -0.009     (0.007)     
Desk for all students (=1 if yes)  1.767*    (0.917)     
Electricity (=1 if yes)  -2.834     (2.292)     
Library (=1 if yes)  -0.994     (0.988)     
Computer (=1 if yes)  -1.084     (0.757)     
Science lab (=1 if yes)  3.178***(0.657)     
School Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  no  no 
Sample size   1379  1408  1408 
a. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
b.*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
c. Household wealth is defined as value of fixed assets plus value of the house. Table 3. Results of Estimating Demand for Math Skills 
Dependent variable = math test score 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Family Background:         
Log expenditure per capita
a   5.400*** (1.973)   5.046*** (1.944)   4.077*     (2.165)   3.975*   (2.361) 
Father’s education   0.209*     (0.118)   0.209*     (0.116)   0.262**   (0.113)   0.310** (0.129) 
Mother’s education  -0.258      (0.164)  -0.303*    (0.160)  -0.197      (0.162)  -0.305    (0.189) 
Father in household   2.652**   (0.827)   2.362*** (0.811)   1.703**   (0.827)   0.776     (1.131) 
Mother in household  -2.584      (2.468)  -2.172      (2.419)  -2.373      (2.383)  -0.838    (2.832) 
Landholding per capita   0.596**   (0.283)   0.578**   (0.277)   0.138       (0.322)   0.022     (0.358) 
    Number of older siblings   2.072*** (0.527)   1.943*** (0.518)   1.777*** (0.506)   1.572** (0.573) 
    Number of younger siblings   2.059*** (0.720)   1.951*** (0.707)   1.437**   (0.679)   1.317*   (0.745) 
Child Characteristics:         
   Female (1=female)  -3.276***(1.103)  -3.033***(1.080)  -3.085*** (1.069)  -2.651** (1.203) 
  Age in month  -1.834***(0.471)  -1.763**  (0.462)  -1.448*** (0.476)  -1.327** (0.525) 
Age in month squared    0.005**  (0.001)   0.005**   (0.001)   0.004*** (0.001)   0.004**  (0.001) 
Innate ability   --   0.290**   (0.042)   0.305*** (0.045)   0.952**  (0.482) 
Gender Effects          
Female×mother’s education   0.626*** (0.209)   0.606*** (0.205)   0.571*** (0.200)   0.562** (0.217) 
School Characteristics:         
Student-teacher ratio   0.042       (0.027)   0.038       (0.027)     
Teachers with experience 
>5 years (%) 
-0.037*    (0.020)  -0.037*    (0.020)     
Teacher with post secondary 
education (%) 
-0.042**  (0.021)  -0.056**  (0.020)     
Dangerous classroom (%)  -0.018      (0.016)  -0.023      (0.016)     
Rainproof classroom (%)  -0.004      (0.011)  -0.005      (0.010)     
Classroom with good light 
condition (%) 
 0.003       (0.011)   0.006       (0.010)     
Desk for all students (=1 if yes)  -1.593      (1.313)  -2.107      (1.289)     
Electricity (=1 if yes)   1.907       (6.196)   2.730       (6.067)     
Library (=1 if yes)   1.220       (1.603)   1.509       (1.572)     
Computer (=1 if yes)   1.976*     (1.094)   2.290**   (1.073)     
Science lab (=1 if yes)   1.757*     (1.019)   0.834       (1.010)     
School Fixed/Random Effects   no   no   Fixed Effects   Fixed Effects 
County Fixed Effects   yes   yes   no   no 
Sample size    1379   1379   1405   1405 
a. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
b. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
c. Log expenditure per capital is instrumented using Log wealth per capita in 2000. Appendix I 
 Table A1. Class Size and School Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable = math test score 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Family Background:       
Father’s education   0.171         (0.153)   0.166        (0.153)   0.237        (0.155) 
Mother’s education   0.004         (0.182)   0.008        (0.182)   0.068        (0.183) 
Father in household   2.274**     (1.011)   2.310**    (1.014)   1.920*      (1.087) 
Mother in household  -4.753        (2.742)  -4.689       (2.770)  -5.024*     (2.881) 
Log exp per capita   7.527***   (2.843)   7.622***  (2.846)   5.989*      (3.299) 
Landholding per capita   0.594         (0.349)   0.565        (0.344)   0.414        (0.412) 
   Number of younger siblings   3.210***   (0.861)   3.265***  (0.865)   2.455***  (0.846) 
   Number of older siblings   2.314***   (0.693)   2.343***  (0.698)   2.250***  (0.637) 
Child Characteristics:       
   Female (1=female)  -0.858        (0.815)  -0.859        (0.816)  -0.577       (0.861) 
  Age in Month  -1.640***  (0.586)  -1.622***  (0.586)  -1.385**   (0.624) 
Age in Month sq.   0.005***   (0.002)   0.005***  (0.001)   0.004***  (0.001) 
Ability   --  --  -- 
School Characteristics:       
Student-teacher ratio   0.027        (0.051)  --  -- 
Class size   --  -0.040       (0.036)  -0.107*     (0.056) 
Teachers experience>5 years (%)  -0.032        (0.016)  -0.033       (0.016)   
Teacher with post secondary 
education (%) 
-0.042        (0.026)  -0.042       (0.027)   
Dangerous classroom (%)  -0.009        (0.013)  -0.012       (0.013)   
Rainproof classroom (%)  -0.019        (0.013)  -0.018       (0.013)   
Classroom with good light 
condition (%) 
 0.019        (0.012)   0.019        (0.011)   
Desk (=1 if yes)   0.440        (1.768)   0.698        (1.796)   
Electricity (=1 if yes)   2.680        (3.142)   2.436        (3.099)   
Library (=1 if yes)   0.822        (1.647)   0.896        (1.650)   
Computer (=1 if yes)   2.207*      (1.272)   1.948        (1.289)   
Science lab (=1 if yes)  -0.649        (1.183)  -0.466       (1.212)   
School Fixed Effect   no   no   yes 
R-squared   0.125   0.124   0.173 
Sample size    953   953   952 
a. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
b.*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Appendix II. The construction of the IV set 
The instruments for the cognitive ability test score is constructed as follows. The famine-
generated IVs are valid only when famine affected people’s innate ability while other time 
periods did not. Therefore, the strategy to search for the IV set starts from effects of parents’ 
birth periods (in years) and then narrows down to the most significant birth months. The first 
regression (column A1 in table A2) uses a set of dummy variables to divide parents’ birth 
periods into three periods: (1) before Liberation in 1949; (2) between 1950 and 1961 and (3) 
after 1961, i.e. after the famine. In the period (2), a dummy variable is created for each year. 
Period (3) was dropped to serve as the omitted category because parents born after 1961 will be 
least likely affected by the famine. The regression result shows that the dummy variables 
indicating that father was born in 1958 (the first year of famine in Gansu) and that mother was 
born in 1956 (people were at age 1-2 when famine occurred) are significant at 10% level. Thus, 
these two year dummies serve as the candidates for constructing suitable IVs. The second 
regression (column A2 in table A2) keeps only dummies for 1956-1961 because for people born 
during this period, their early childhood (age 0-2) will be affected by the famine. The results are 
similar to that in column A1.   
The third regression (column A3 in table A2) keeps only dummies for father born in 
1958 and mother born in 1956; they are both significant at 5 percent level. To search for 
instrument variables with stronger predictive power, the fourth regression model (column A4 in 
table A2) replaces these two birth year dummies by 24 dummies indicating each birth month in 
these two years. The most significant dummy variables are the ones indicating that father was 
born in July of 1958 and that mother was born in December of 1956. They are jointly significant 
and p=0.0000 level. Therefore, these two are the IV sets used in the reduced form regressions.Table A2. Constructing Famine-Generated Instruments 
  A1  A2  A3    A4  A5 
Family Background:        Family Background:     
Father’s education  -0.07      (0.08)  -0.09     (0.07)  -0.09    (0.07)  Father’s education  -0.07         (0.07)  -0.07         (0.07) 
Mother’s education  0.16*     (0.08)  0.14*     (0.08)  0.13      (0.08)  Mother’s education  0.12          (0.08)  0.13          (0.08) 
Father in hh  1.44**   (0.54)  1.48*** (0.54)  1.47***(0.54)  Father in hh  1.46***    (0.54)  1.46***    (0.54) 
Mother in hh  -2.28      (1.56)  -2.35      (1.55)  -2.51     (1.55)  Mother in hh  -2.42         (1.56)  -2.43         (1.53) 
Log exp per capita  1.03*** (0.39)  0.99**   (0.39)  1.00**  (0.39)  Log exp per capita  0.99**      (0.39)  0.97**      (0.39) 
Land per capita  0.12       (0.21)  0.14       (0.21)  0.15      (0.21)  Land per capita  0.13          (0.21)  0.15          (0.21) 
 # Younger Siblings   0.32       (0.41)  0.25       (0.40)  0.24      (0.40)   Younger Siblings   0.29          (0.40)  0.31          (0.40) 
 # Older Siblings   0.17       (0.35)  0.33       (0.33)  0.34      (0.32)    Older Siblings   0.41          (0.33)  0.44           (0.32) 
Child Characteristics:        Child Characteristics:     
   Female (1=female)  -0.58      (0.43)  -0.57      (0.43)  -0.60      (0.43)     Female (1=female)  -0.59         (0.43)  -0.59         (0.43) 
  Age in Month  -0.17      (0.31)  -0.16      (0.33)  -0.17      (0.30)    Age in Month  -0.15         (0.31)  -0.21         (0.31) 
Age in Month sq.  0.00       (0.00)  0.00       (0.00)  0.00       (0.00)  Age in Month sq.  0.00          (0.00)  0.00           (0.00) 
Father’s birth period        Father’s birth period     
Before 1949  -0.84      (2.00)      Jan-1958  2.29          (2.97)   
1950  1.59       (2.81)      Feb-1958  4.49          (4.16)   
1951  1.19       (3.14)      Mar-1958  13.04*      (7.39)  12.94*       (7.37) 
1952  -1.65      (3.24)      Apr-1958  1.90          (4.46)   
    1953  0.81       (1.88)      May-1958  -6.20         (5.08)   
    1954  0.33       (0.62)      June-1958  --   
    1955  -0.75      (1.24)      July-1958  20.47*** (7.63)  20.43***   (7.61) 
    1956  1.65       (1.57)  1.78      (1.52)    Aug-1958  -2.12        (4.27)   
    1957  -0.22      (1.21)  -0.16     (1.16)    Sep-1958  3.29         (5.15)   
    1958  2.56*      (1.42)  2.56*    (1.39)  2.71**  (1.35)   Oct-1958  3.6           (3.34)   
    1959  1.21       (1.45)  1.08      (1.43)    Nov-1958  0.90         (4.15)   
  1960  0.62       (1.00)  0.39      (0.98)    Dec-1958  3.89         (5.12)   
    1961  -1.04      (1.37)  -1.20     (1.36)         
Mother’s birth period        Mother’s birth period     
Before 1949  2.91       (3.07)      Jan-1956  4.05         (7.35)   
1950  1.58       (3.04)      Feb-1956  1.43         (5.14)   
1951  6.34       (4.04)      Mar-1956  -6.30        (4.26)   
1952  1.68       (3.20)      Apr-1956  --   
    1953  4.77       (3.21)      May-1956  -7.91        (7.23)   
    1954  1.68       (2.66)      Jun-1956  --   
    1955  2.22       (2.68)      Jul-1956  2.01         (5.13)       1956  -3.96**  (1.97)  -4.66** (1.80)  -4.57** (1.79)  Aug-1956  -0.37        (4.63)   
    1957  -2.07      (2.18)  -2.56     (2.11)    Sep-1956  -10.50**  (4.32)  -10.56**   (4.30) 
    1958  2.03       (1.91)  1.50      (1.79)    Oct-1956  -0.50        (7.26)   
    1959  -1.41      (2.48)  -1.65     (2.42)    Nov-1956  -12.86**  (7.26)  -12.92*     (7.23) 
    1960  0.50       (1.57)  0.04      (1.52)    Dec-1956  -15.86**  (7.12)  -15.79*** (7.10)   
    1961  1.07       (1.52)  0.77      (1.49)         
School Fixed Effect  yes  yes  yes  School Fixed Effect  yes  yes 




    F(  5,  1212) =    
4.90 
Prob > F =    
0.0002 
 
a. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
b.*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 